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ADR in Labor and Employment
Law During the Past
Quarter Century

Theodore J. St. Antoine*

I. Introduction

Two events can serve as bookends for alternative dis
tion (ADR) in labor and employment law during the past
tury. The first was the 1991 U.S. Supreme Court decision
Interstate I Johnson Lane Corp} The Court approved so-c
tory arbitration" by holding that an individual stockbro
was bound by a contract with the New York Stock Exch
trate a claim of age discrimination against his employer
take the case to court. The second event, or set of events, i
consideration by Congress of the proposed Employee Fre

(EFCA) and Arbitration Fairness Act3 (AFA).

As introduced, EFCA would enable unions to get bargaining rights
through signed authorization cards rather than a secret-ballot election
and would provide for the arbitration of first-contract terms if negotiations fail to produce an agreement after four months. The AFA would
amend the Federal Arbitration Act4 (FAA) to prohibit most pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate employment or civil rights claims. That legislation would effectively overrule Gilmer.

Quite appropriately, Gilmer is the most significant and most debated ADR decision in labor and employment law during the past quarter century. Throughout this period, developments in employment law,

dealing with individual employee-employer relations, overshadowed

developments in labor law, dealing with traditional union-management
relations. This Article will therefore first treat emerging ADR law and

*James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan.
1. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). That was not exactly a quarter century ago. But it is now
commonplace for historians to mark August 1914 as the real start of the twentieth century, with the onset of the First World War. I indulge in similar flexibility in dating here.
Besides, as recounted in Part II-A, infra, Gilmer was the culmination of nationwide legal
developments going back to the 1980s. For a good overview of the ADR process, see How

ADR Works (Norman Brand ed., 2002).

2. H.K. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).

3. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).

4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
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practice in the employment sphere and then turn to the less arresting
but still noteworthy refinements of ADR in labor law.

II. ADR in Individual Employment Relations
A. 1980s' Qualifications on Employment at Will
The 1980s saw a major revolution in employment law across
this country. Initially this was a matter of judicial developments in
substantive law, but eventually it would have a profound effect on
ADR. The point of departure was the traditional American doctrine
of "employment at will." Under it, as callously explained in a classic
nineteenth century case, employers may lawfully "dismiss their employees at will . . .for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong."5 Except for statutory prohibitions under the civil rights laws,
this right to fire arbitrarily remained pretty much the universal rule
in the United States until recently. In 1959, one California court found
it too hard to swallow when an employer discharged an employee for

refusing to commit perjury at the employer's behest.6 But that sustaining of an employee's cause of action for unconscionable treatment
was a rarity. Then, beginning in 1980, came a flood of court decisions
that ultimately reached every state except Florida, Louisiana, and
Rhode Island and imposed at least some limitations on the absolutist
reign of at-will employment.7
Three principal legal theories, with variants, came into use. Torts
included discharges contrary to public policy8 and abusive or retaliatory discharges.9 Contract claims could be based on oral commitments
to an employee at the time of hiring10 or statements of policy in per-

5. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). See also Horace G. Wood,

A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant 272-73 (2d ed. 1886).

6. Petermann v. Inn bhd. ot Teamsters Local aye, 344 r:za hZb (Uai. Dist. ut. App.

1959).

7. Employment at Will, State Rulings Chart, 9A Individual Emp. Rts. Man. (BNA)

505:51 (2009).

8. Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (employee refused to join
price-fixing conspiracy); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980)
(whistleblower); Palmateer ν. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (111. 1981) (same). Con-

tra Murnhv v. Am. Home Prod. Coro.. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (whistleblower).

9. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (employee refused
foreman's sexual advances; applying Arkansas law); Wagenseiler ν. Scottsdale Mem'l
Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) (employee refused to join co-workers in "mooning");

Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (employee supported co-worker's sexual harassment charges; court said retaliation claim must be based on constitutional or statutory provision). But cf. Baila ν. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (111. 1991) (in-house counsel
not allowed to claim retaliatory discharge).
10. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980);
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), overruled on other
grounds by Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000); Grouse v. Group Health
Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (reliance also a factor).
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sonnel manuals.11 The third and potentially most expansive theory of
recovery for wrongful discharge was based on the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, but only about a dozen states have accepted it.12

These newly recognized causes of action initially produced a bonanza for certain employees. Judges and juries awarded substantial
damages to workers who were wrongfully discharged. For example,
several studies showed that plaintiffs in California won about 67.5 percent of the discharge cases that went to juries, with the average award
being around $450,000. 13 Nationwide, single individuals received jury
awards for actual and punitive damages for wrongful discharge as high

as $20 million, with awards exceeding one million dollars not uncom-

mon.14 Even winning was not cost-free for business. By the end of the

1980s the fees and expenses for a successful defense of a discharge
case before a jury could range between $100,000 and $150,000 in major
Midwestern cities, and amount to around $200,000 on the coasts.15
B. Employer Reactions; Mandatory Arbitration; Gilmer
Employers took a number of steps to counter these new legal developments. More circumspect behavior would avoid most tort claims,
but that was not a large problem anyway. Few employers are going to
fire employees for refusing to engage in criminal conduct. Contract
actions could be negated by properly drafted and conspicuous disclaimers.16 Employers might even be able to revoke previous promises

11. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985), modified, 499
A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982) (reliance
also a factor). Previously, such statements would have been regarded as mere "puffing"
or expressions of employer policy without legal significance.

12. Buysse v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 623 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1980)
(applying Minnesota law); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). See
also Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). Contra Murphy v.
Am. Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
13. James N. Dertouzos et al., The Legal and Economic Consequences of Wrongful
Termination 24-26, 33-37 (1988); Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: "Dagwood" and Goliath, 62 Mich. B.J. 776 (1983); California Wrongful Discharge Verdicts Averaged $424,527 in 1986 Jury Trials, 35 Dailv Lab. Rep. (BNA). at A-4 (Feb. 24. 1987).
14. Kenneth Lopatka & Julia Martin, Developments in the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 1986 A.B.A. Nat'l Inst. on Litigating Wrongful Discharge & Invasion of Privacy
Claims vii, 13-18(1986).

15. These figures are from conversations between the author and management
attorneys at the 1992 Midwinter Meeting of the ABA Labor and Employment Law
Section's Committee on Individual Rights and Responsibilities in the Workplace on
April 8-9, 1992.
16. Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Michigan
law); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 1995) (unambiguous

disclaimer effective despite placement on last page of fifty-three page handbook). But cf.
Jones v. Cent. Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989) (one-sentence disclaimer
in eighty-five-page manual ineffective as unclear and inconspicuous).
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contained in personnel manuals through a reasonable notice to the
workforce.17

Many employers went one step further. They required all their
employees, as a condition for getting or keeping a job, to agree that
all disputes between workers and management arising out of the employment relationship, including statutory claims, would have to be
resolved through arbitration systems established by the employer. The

employees had to waive all right to bring any action on such claims
against their employers in federal or state court. By 2001, a study for
the American Arbitration Association (AAA) reported that six million
employees were covered by employment arbitration plans administered
by AAA, apparently all or most being of this mandatory type.18 Another
study indicated that by 2002 the total number of employees covered by
nonunion employment arbitration plans might be even higher than the

number covered by traditional collective bargaining labor arbitration
agreements.19
As previously mentioned, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively upheld mandatory arbitration plans in the famous Gilmer decision.20 The
Court emphasized that the stockbroker employee had suffered no loss
of substantive rights; it was only a change of forum.21 The stockbroker
was not precluded, however, from filing a charge with the EEOC; only
his own court action was barred.22 Moreover, the agreement in Gilmer

17. Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1999). But cf. Doyle v. Holy
Cross Hosp., 682 N.E.2d 68 (111. App. Ct. 1997) (twelve-year-old commitment could not be

revoked without consideration).

18. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, Disp.
Resol. J., May-Jul. 2003, at 8, 10.
19. See Alexander J.S. Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 Cornell J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 581, 587-91 (2004). The smaller number of reported decisions in employment arbitrations may raise questions, however, about this asserted comparability. Still, twentyfive percent of the companies in a recent survey required nonunion employment disputes
to be arbitrated. See 2008 Litigation Trends Survey Released, 63 Disp. Resol. J., Nov.
2008^Jan. 2009, at 7. See also David Lewin, Employee Voice and Mutual Gains, 60 Lab. &
Emp. Rel. Ass'n 61 (2008) (354 of 757 nonunion businesses surveyed in 2007, or 46.8%,
had promulgated employment arbitration programs).
20. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The Court declared
the arbitration agreement there was not contrary to the policy of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006), and was enforceable under the Federal
Arbitration Act. Gilmer was reaffirmed in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001) (holding 5-4 that the FAA exempts only contracts of transportation workers from
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements). For a fuller picture of the legal status of
arbitration preceding Gilmer, see John Kagel, Arbitration and Due Process: The Way We
Were at the Time of Gilmer, 11 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 267 (2007).
21. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-28.
22. Id. at 28. The Court since has held that an individual's agreement to arbitrate

employment disputes does not prevent the EEOC from seeking victim-specific relief in
court, including reinstatement, back pay, and damages. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534

U.S. 279, 286 (2002). The EEOC does not have the resources, however, to litigate all
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plainly authorized the arbitrator to handle statutory claims as well
as contractual claims. Lastly, the Court held that the arbitral procedures must not impair employees' capacity to vindicate their statutory
rights.23

C. The Pros and Cons of Gilmer
Gilmer touched off a roiling debate in academic circles, in various

interested groups, and among employer and employee partisans. On
the face of it, conditioning job rights on agreeing to a private decision-

maker in an employer-created tribunal as a substitute for the judgeand-jury system ordained by Congress (or by a state legislature) would
seem a grave affront to public policy. After all, the particular procedures used to enforce substantive rights, including sensitive civil rights

claims, may often be almost as critical as the rights themselves. It is
no wonder that several scholars, two federal agencies, and two prestigious panels - one government-sponsored and one private - registered
strong opposition to mandatory arbitration of statutory employment
claims.24

meritorious cases and must leave most to the charging parties to pursue on their own.
See Maurice E.R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice Imperfect, 13 Yale L. & Pol'y
Rev. 219, 270-75 (1995).
23. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28, 30-32. In an earlier case, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme Court held an arbitrator's adverse decision under a
collective bargaining agreement did not prevent a black employee from pursuing in court
his claim that his discharge was racially discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 59. There the Court concluded that, unlike in Gilmer, the arbitrator was not authorized to deal with statutory claims. Id. at 53-54. Gilmer also said

that Gardner-Denver involved a "tension" between union representation and individual

statutory rights. 500 U.S. at 35.
24. See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims:
Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 1 (1996); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog

Contract of the 1990s, 73 Denver U. L. Rev. 1017 (1996); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing
Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. Rev. 33; Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration:
Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L.

685 (2004); EEOC: Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy, 8 Fair Emp. Prac. (BNA)
405:7301, 405:7302 (1997). In July 1997, the EEOC issued a longer and even stronger

condemnation of compulsory arbitration or pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, declaring that "even the best arbitral systems do not afford the benefits of the judicial system."

EEOC: Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of
Employment, 8 Fair Emp. Prac. (BNA) 405:7511, 405:7520 (1997). According to the court
in Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the National Labor Relations Board General Counsel was once prepared to issue unfair labor practice complaints
on the issue. Id. at 1479. See also Commission on the Future of Worker-Management

Relations, U.S. Dep'ts of Labor & Commerce, Report and Recommendations 33 (1994)
[hereinafter Dunlop Commission Report]; Statement of the National Academy of Arbitrators on Condition of Employment Agreements, 50 Nat'l Acad. Arb. app. at 312 (Joyce M.
Najita ed., 1998). The National Academy of Arbitrators softened its opposition somewhat
on May 20, 2009, stating that "voluntary arbitration is always preferable," and "it is
desirable for employees to be allowed to opt freely, post-dispute, for either the courts
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Both sides make other, more pragmatic arguments. An employer
dealing with an individual employee is the "repeat player" against
the one-timer, and arbitrators may be affected by knowing who is the

much likelier source of future business.25 One reputable study indicates, however, that the greater success of the repeat player is simply
the result of employer experience, not arbitrator bias.26 In any event,
the repeat-player effect should diminish with the increasing growth of

a plaintiffs-claimants bar. Some sizable, well-publicized jury verdicts
could do considerably more, it is said, to deter workplace discrimination than any number of smaller, confidential arbitration awards.27 Yet
it is widely recognized that the certainty of sanctions is usually more
of a deterrent than their severity.28

A distinguished federal judge has observed that the diversion of
a large amount of civil rights litigation from the courts to arbitration,

with the resulting decrease in the number of published judicial opinions, could have an enervating effect on the development of legal doctrine in this area.29 But concerns that private arbitration will hinder

the development of judicial doctrine in the civil rights area seem illfounded in light of the very large federal caseload dealing with employment discrimination.30 Finally, an employer's provision for arbitration

is arguably a not-so-subtle antiunion device, because a grievance

and arbitration system is regarded as one of the principal benefits of
unionization and collective bargaining. On the other hand, the history

and administrative tribunals or arbitration." See National Academy of Arbitrators, Policy Statement on Employment Arbitration (May 20, 2009), http://www.naarb.org/due_
process/due_process.html.
25. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 Emp.
Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 189 (1997). Cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves'* Come Out
Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 Ohio St. J. on Disp.
Resol. 19 (1999).

26. David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1557,
1571 (2005).

27. See, e.g., Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: tiights Wawea

and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 381, 429-31 (1996). Arbitral
awards are customarily not published unless all parties consent, but many decisions are
published by the American Arbitration Association, the Bureau of National Affairs, and
Commerce Clearing House.
28. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83
Va. L. Rev. 349, 380 (1997); Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 721, 731 (2005).
29. Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 293, 297 (1999).
30. Filings οι civil rights employment claims in tederal court averaged aoout ιο,ουυ
cases a year from 2004 through 2008. That is about twice the average total of cases under
all labor laws, excluding the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Admin-

istrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 2008 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts tbl.C-2A, at 147-48 (2009), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/judbus2008/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
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recounted above indicates that employers' resort to mandatory arbitration in the 1980s was triggered far more by the size of jury verdicts and
the cost of litigation than by efforts to stymie union organization.31

D. Forum Comparisons
1. Accessibility
Opponents of mandatory arbitration object to it primarily on the
basis of broad principles of fairness and public policy. Apologists rely

on such practical considerations as the relative ease of access to arbitration vis-à-vis the courts, and a comparison of the results in these

different forums. A survey of plaintiffs' attorneys estimated that they
accepted only about five percent of the individuals with employment

claims who sought legal representation.32 A leading employment specialist in Detroit told me that his secretary kept an actual count; he
took on one out of eighty-seven persons who requested his assistance.
In a comprehensive review of empirical studies of employment arbitra-

tion, Professor Alexander Colvin of Cornell University indicated that
"one of the key potential advantages of employment arbitration over
litigation is that the relatively high costs of litigation inhibit access to
the courts by lower to mid-income . . . employees."33 One study concluded

that employees having less than a $60,000 annual income generally
cannot afford court litigation, but arbitration remains a viable option.34
In 2007, the median income of full-time, year-round U.S. workers under
65 was $41,061. 35 Arbitration would seem the most realistic recourse

31. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15. Except for a short-lived spurt during the Korean War in the 1950s, union density has been in steady decline since 1947,
when the Taft-Hartley Act was passed. That year, unionized employees constituted 33.7
percent of nonagricultural employment. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Handbook of Labor Statistics 507 (1978). By 2009, union density had fallen to 12.3 percent overall and to 7.2 percent in the private sector. News Release, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Union Members-2009 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at www.
bls.gov/news.release/pdi/ union2.pdf. Union membership was 15.3 million, a decline of

771,000 from 2008, attributed largely to the recession. Id.
32. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 29, 58 (1998); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? What Really Should Happen?, Disp.
Resol. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40, 45.
33. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity
Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 405, 419 (2007) (citing Samuel
Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment

Arbitration Agreements, 16 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 559, 563-64 (2001)); Theodore
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, Disp. Resol. J., Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004, 44, 53 (2003).
34. Hill, supra note 18, at 10-11. On the plight of low-income persons with civil

claims generally, see David S. Udell & Rebekah Oilier, Access to the Courts: An Essay for
the Georgetown University Law Center Conference on the Independence of the Courts, 95
Geo. L.J. 1127, 1130-36 (2007).

35. U.S. Census Bureau, Selected Characteristics of People 15 Years Old and Over
by Total Money Income in 2007, Work Experience in 2007, Race, Hispanic Origin, and
Sex (Aug. 26, 2008), http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032008/perinc/new01_028.htm.
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for such persons. One of the most cautious studies of the relative costs
of arbitration and court suits concluded: "The empirical evidence suggests that arbitration may be a more accessible forum than courts for
lower income employees and consumers with small claims."36

Lewis Maltby, President of the National Workrights Institute,
has been an advocate of arbitration but an opponent of the mandatory variety as a matter of principle. Yet at a conference sponsored by
the National Academy of Arbitrators in Chicago in 2007, he recounted
his troubling experience while director of the American Civil Liberties

Union's Task Force on Civil Liberties in the Workplace. Many persons
approached him with reports of wrongful treatment in their jobs. Although he concluded most of the claims were unsustainable, he believed

a couple dozen or so were legitimate and should be taken to court. He
placed many calls asking lawyers for assistance. Even with Maltby's
expert prescreening of the cases, he was able to find representation for
only one employee.37 After further studying the available data, Maltby
concluded that twice as many employees could afford to go to arbitra-

tion as could afford court suits.38

Neither the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
nor a small claims court seems the likely salvation for the low-income

employee. The EEOC is so underfunded and understaffed that one
knowledgeable scholar has recommended, quite sensibly, that the Com-

mission get out of the business of handling individual charges and

husband its limited resources for routing out systemic unlawful practices.39 At best, the Commission tends to concentrate on the big case or
the test case. Small-claims courts will ordinarily be no answer either.

They generally are authorized only to issue damage awards in a limited amount, typically on the order of $5,000. Even more important,
they customarily do not exercise the equitable jurisdiction to provide
what may be most desired - an order restoring the employee's job.
2. Outcomes

Comparing the results of employee claims pursued in arbitration
with those in court immediately confronts the apples-and-oranges
problem. Some early studies of arbitration awards disproportionately
reflected cases involving high-level employees operating under individually negotiated contracts rather than rank-and-file workers claim-

36. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical
Evidence, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 813, 840 (2008).
37. See Richard A. Bales, Beyond the Protocol: Recent Trends in Employment Arbitration, 11 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 301 (2007); Arnold M. Zack, The Due Process Protocol: Getting There and Getting Over It, 11 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 257 (2007).
38. Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 105, 117 (2003).
39. Munroe, supra note 22, at 278-79.

ADR in Labor and Employment Law 419
ing under employee handbooks.40 The former fared significantly better.

Professor Lisa Bingham of Indiana University found in two separate
studies that employees won 68.8 percent and 61.3 percent of claims
based on individual contracts but only 21.3 percent and 27.6 percent of

claims based on personnel manuals.41 A later report on 200 American

Arbitration Association arbitral awards from 1999 and 2000 showed

a lower-income employee win rate of 34 percent in cases based on
employer-mandated plans as against an overall win rate of 43 percent

for all claims.42 Another comparative difficulty is summary judgment relatively rare in arbitration but common in court litigation - and the

classification of prehearing or pre-trial settlements in either forum

Professor Colvin has pointed out that since employers win the vast majority of summary judgments in federal court employment cases, and

since employers naturally seek to settle the stronger employee cases
during preliminary proceedings in litigation, decent arguments can be
made either way about whether trial results exaggerate or depress employee win rates, at least in federal court.43

Nonetheless, despite these qualifications, several empirical studies by serious scholars have shown arbitration to be surprisingly favor-

able to employees as compared with court litigation. For higher-paid
employees, probably grieving under individual contracts, arbitral
win rates in different studies ranged between about 40 percent and
69 percent. For lower-paid employees, presumably relying on handbook provisions, arbitral win rates were between about 21 percent and

40 percent. By contrast, various studies found the figures for court

cases, most of which were likely to involve higher-paid employees, running between about 12 percent and 57 percent.44 It does not seem at all
unfair for Professors David Sherwyn and Michael Heise of Cornell and
Samuel Estreicher of New York University to sum up these and other
empirical studies by stating that "there is no evidence that plaintiffs
fare significantly better in litigation [than in arbitration] ,"45 At worst

40. Colvin, supra note 33, at 413.
41. Lisa B. Bingham, Ατι Overview of Employment Arbitration in the United States:

Law, Public Policy and Data, N.Z. J. Indus. Rel., June 1998, at 5, 16; Lisa B. Bingham &
Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process Protocol for
Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, 53 Nat'l Acad. Arb. 303, 323
(Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004).
42. Hill, supra note 18, at 11, 13.

43. Colvin, supra note 33, at 417-18.
44. In addition to the authorities cited infra notes 39-41, see Eisenberg & Hill,
supra note 33, at 48-49, tbl.l (employees earning less than $60,000 a year were classified as "lower-paid"); Hoyt N. Wheeler, Brian S. Klaas & Douglas M. Mahony, Workplace
Justice Without Unions 48, 54 (2004); Maltby, supra note 32, at 46, 49, 54; Maltby, supra

note 38, at 108-12.

45. Sherwyn, supra note 26, at 1578.
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the differences in outcomes for comparable groups of claimants appear
negligible.

One qualification must be noted on the comparability of arbitration and litigation results. It seems clear that while claimants generally fare about as well (or better) in arbitration as in court, extremely
large awards are more common in litigation, especially by juries.46
Another highly important fact was found in a study by Professor

Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill. They examined 215 American
Arbitration Association employment arbitration cases resolved between

1999 and 2000. Only forty-two of those cases, or 19.5 percent, dealt
with statutory civil rights claims.47 Other studies revealed even lower

percentages of such statutory cases.48 The vast majority were based
on individual contracts or personnel manuals. That sharply reduces
the argument that arbitration, whether mandatory or not, is adversely
affecting the enforcement of civil rights legislation. Indeed, employers'
desire to impose mandatory arbitration is frequently accompanied by
a willingness to grant "good cause" contractual protections, a benefit of
great value to employees in employment-at-will America.

There have been few attempts to compare win rates in employment arbitration with those in union-management labor arbitration.49 Recently I reviewed the outcomes of 200 discharge grievances
filed from 1999 to 2007 in one of the country's oldest and most respected union-management arbitration systems. I would call it a
"gold standard" for arbitration. The issue was whether there was
"just cause" or "proper cause" for the discharges under the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. Employees were reinstated or received other substantial relief in only forty-six instances, or twenty-three percent of the 200 arbitrations.50 That is a lower winning

46. Maltby, supra note 38, at 114-15, 117-18. For a serious critique of the methodology in the foregoing empirical studies, see David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration
and Fairness, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1247, 1283-314 (2009). But Professor Schwartz is
opposed to empirical studies in this area, apparently considering mandatory arbitration
inherently "unfair," and offers no systematic figures of his own based on how it actually
operates.

47. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 33, at 49.
48. Maltby, supra note 38, at 112 (finding 1.8% to 7%).
49. For a comparison of the way employment arbitrators and labor arbitrators
treat hypothetical scenarios, see Lisa B. Bingham & Deborah J. Mesch, Decision Making
in Employment and Labor Arbitration, 39 Indus. Rel. 671 (2000); Brian S. Klaas, Douglas Mahony & Hoyt N. Wheeler, Decision-Making about Workplace Disputes: A PolicyCapturing Study of Employment Arbitrators, Labor Arbitrators, and Jurors, 45 Indus.
Rel. 68 (2006). Employment arbitrators were less likely to rule for employees than labor
arbitrators. But Bingham and Mesch found no statistically significant employment-labor
distinction if the occupation of the arbitrator was taken into account. Attorney arbitrators were less favorable toward employees than full-time arbitrators or arbitrators from

academia.

50. The low employee success rate is probably explained by the company s acquir
knowledge of arbitral standards and the union's willingness to let grievants have the
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percentage than in all but one of the employment arbitration studies
previously discussed.

E. Changing Attitudes
Although the Gilmer decision and the whole concept of mandatory
arbitration initially evoked an academic chorus of condemnation, scholars and other disinterested observers now seem more disposed toward
reformation rather than outright prohibition.51 But ironically the very

same empirical data that may have affected this shift of attitude by
showing the advantages of arbitration, even mandatory arbitration, for

employees may also have caused employers to have second thoughts

about the process.52 At a recent meeting of labor and employment law-

yers in Michigan, I could not find a single top management attorney
who was currently advising clients to start or retain a mandatory arbitration system. Three reasons were given: Employees win too often; it is
hard to get summary judgment in arbitration; and full appellate review

is not available.53 I still hope, however, that arbitration will prove a
win-win situation. Employees, particularly lower-paid workers, would
find readier access to effective relief, and employers would find lower
litigation costs and no devastating jury verdicts.
F. Due Process

1. Proposals; the Due Process Protocol
By the mid-1990s, two variegated groups had responded

spreading use of mandatory arbitration agreements by proposin
similar lists of procedural protections for employees. One body

Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
called Dunlop Commission.54 The other was a broadly repres
Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employmen

"day in court." Earlier studies indicated disciplinary grievants generally wo
or in part about half the time in labor arbitrations. Bingham, supra note 4
See also Laura J. Cooper, Mario F. Bognanno & Stephen F. Befort, How and W
Arbitrators Decide Discipline and Discharge Cases, 60 Nat'l Acad. Arb. 420 (S
Befort, Patrick Halter & Paul D. Staudohar eds., 2008).
51. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Law and Practice of Arbitration
2007); Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitab
Arbitration Act, 113 Penn. St. L. Rev. 1081 (2009); Samuel Estreicher, Predisp

ments to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1344 (1997
FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 221 (199
52. Cf. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage fr

Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 Rutgers L.J. 399, 418

Daniel B. Tukel, To Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate Discrimination Claims: That Is
Question for Michigan Employers, 79 Mich. B.J. 1206, 1207-08 (2000).
53. For a discussion of the potential shortcomings of mandatory arbitra
an employer's perspective, see Charles D. Coleman, Is Mandatory Employmen
tion Living Up to Its Expectations? A View from the Employer's Perspective, 25

Lab. & Emp. L. 227 (2010).

54. See Dunlop Commission Report, supra note 24, at 30-32.
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drafted the now-famous and influential Employment Due Process Protocol.55 Each group called essentially for the following guarantees:

1. A jointly selected neutral arbitrator who knows the law;
2. Simple, adequate discovery;
3. Cost-sharing to ensure arbitrator neutrality;56
4. Right to representation by a person of the employee's choice;

5. Remedies equal to those provided by the law;
6. A written opinion and award, with reasons; and
7. Limited judicial review, concentrating on the law.

The Task Force that produced the Due Process Protocol, whose
members were designated by a wide spectrum of organizations, was
unable to reach accord on the acceptability of pre-dispute as distinguished from post-dispute agreements to arbitrate - and thus effectively on their "voluntariness"57 - but it did agree they should be
"knowingly made."58 In contrast, the more homogeneous Dunlop Commission, consisting mostly of academics and neutral persons, declared:
"[A]ny choice between available methods for enforcing statutory em-

ployment rights should be left to the individual who feels wronged
rather than dictated by his or her employment contract."59 Significantly, however, Professor Paul Weiler of Harvard, who served as counsel to the Commission, told me he had reservations about this position

on the grounds that even mandatory arbitration provided employees
with access to relief they might not otherwise have to contest employ-

ment wrongdoing. The Commission itself suggested that this issue

55. Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, A Due Process

Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employ-

ment Relationship (1995), reprinted in 9A Individual Emp. Rts. Man. (BNA) 534:401
(1996) [hereinafter Due Process Protocol]. The Task Force consisted of management,
union, and plaintiffs' attorneys from the American Bar Association and the National
Employment Lawyers Association, and representatives of the American Arbitration Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service, the National Academy of Arbitrators, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute

Resolution.

56. In Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the court required (2-1) the employer to pay all the arbitrator's fees as a condition for enforcing an
individual employee's waiver of a judicial forum. Id. at 1468. Judge Harry Edwards, who
spoke for the majority, was surely correct that the source of payment is not the key to
arbitrator neutrality. Id. at 1485. Arbitrators are naturally concerned about getting their
fee but ordinarily not about where it comes from. Id. Individual employees, of course,
may feel more comfortable paying part of the arbitrator's fees, fearing that whoever pays
the piper may also call the tune. Cole may have gone too far, however, in insisting that
the employer pay all of the arbitrator's fee. Id. at 1484. Access to a court, at least initially,
would normally not be cost-free.
57. See infra text accompanying note 122.
58. Due Process Protocol, supra note 55, at 534:402.
59. Dunlap Commission Report, supra note 24, at 33.
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should be revisited after there was more experience with employment
arbitration.60

Both the major arbitrator-designating agencies in employment arbitration, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and JAMS (formerly the Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services), have committed

themselves to handling only cases in employer-imposed systems that

ensure procedural fairness.61 A representative of the AAA was a signatory to the Due Process Protocol.
Refining or extending the work of the Dunlop Commission and the

Due Process Task Force, other groups and individuals have come close
to a consensus on the standards of fairness required for legitimacy in
mandatory arbitration. Representative of this work were papers presented by Professors Richard A. Bales of Northern Kentucky University and Martin H. Malin of Chicago-Kent College of Law at the 2007
conference sponsored by the National Academy of Arbitrators on "Beyond the Due Process Protocol."62 Some of the principal proposals for

going beyond the Protocol include prohibitions of (1) a shortening of the
applicable statutory limitations period, or at least any excessive shortening; (2) scheduling arbitration hearings at times or places that would

be inconvenient for employees or their representatives or witnesses;
(3) bans on class actions which would hinder employees in vindicating
certain legitimate interests, such as small monetary claims that would

not be worth individual pursuit; and (4) charging excessive arbitrator
fees and expenses to employees, for example, amounts that would be
greater than the filing fee required by the court where an action would
be brought on such a claim.

2. Judicial Developments
Many courts have made constructive contributions in developing
due process requirements for a valid employment arbitration system.
Thus, in Cole v. Burns International Security Services,63 the District of
Columbia Circuit held that a court could enforce a mandatory employment arbitration arrangement as long as it
60. Id.

61. Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law
and the Need for Self-Regulation, 11 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 363, 398-99 (2007). The
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) does not handle nonunion employ

ment arbitration cases.

62. See generally Bales, supra note 37; Malin, supra note 61, at 363. See also National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 24. One of the foremost proponents and a
principal drafter of the Due Process Protocol has contended that it was the product of a
unique historical moment and reopening it for amendment could be counterproductive.

See Zack, supra note 37. For a close examination of one exemplary arbitration system, see

Richard A. Bales & Jason N.W. Plowman, Compulsory Arbitration as Part of a Broader
Employment Dispute Resolution Process: The Anheuser-Busch Example, 6 Hofstra Lab. &
Emp. L.J. 1 (2008).

63. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than mini-

mal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of

the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5)

does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any

arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitra-

tion forum.64

Nonetheless, judicial decisions are in conflict and critics are skeptical whether judges alone can complete the task without legislation
and greater self-regulation by the parties and designating agencies.65
In assessing the fairness of arbitration plans, courts have relied primarily on two concepts: Gilmer 's requirement that employees must be
able to vindicate their statutory claims effectively and the common-law
doctrine of unconscionability.66 Despite the willingness of the court in
Cole to determine for itself the fairness of an arbitration system for
the vindication of statutory rights, the Supreme Court in several nonemployment cases has indicated that the question is generally one for

the arbitratror, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.67 Courts seem
more willing to deal directly with unconscionability issues in arbitra-

tion rather than leaving them to arbitrators.68
a. Arbitrator Selection

The Due Process Protocol apparently contemplates that the pa

ties will select an arbitrator from a panel list supplied by a neutral d
ignating agency such as the American Arbitration Association.69 One
the most pro-arbitration federal courts, the Fourth Circuit, invalidat

an employer's unilaterally established arbitral rules as "so one-sid

that their only possible purpose is to undermine the neutrality of th
proceeding,"70 in part because the employer was given unlimited con
trol over the composition of the arbitration panel.
The Sixth Circuit went further in invalidating an arbitration sele
tion procedure on the grounds the employer still had "exclusive cont

64. Id. at 1482 (emphasis removed).
65. See, e.g., Bales, supra note 37, at 319-31; 335-37; Malm, supra note bl, at
386-96. See also Bales, supra note 51, at 1099-1101.
66. Malin, supra note 61, at 368-85.
67. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.

Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440

(2006). But cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), which initiated
a case-by-case approach but seemed to assume that the task was for the courts. Professor
Malin espouses bright-line rules, applied by the courts. Malin, supra note 61, at 367-78.
68. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Fsychcare Serv., ö f.'ôa bby tuai, ζυυυ;.
In Jackson v. Rent-a-Center W., Inc., 581 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2009), cert, granted, 130 S. Ct.
1133 (2010), the court of appeals held that the question of the unconscionability of an
employee's agreement to arbitrate was for the court to decide, not the arbitrator, even
though the agreement had expressly assigned that issue to the arbitrator. Id. at 917.
69. Due Process Protocol, supra note 55, at 534:403.
70. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999).
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over the pool of potential arbitrators,"71 even though the arbitrators
on the panel had to meet specified qualifications to ensure neutrality.
A substantial number of existing mandatory arbitration plans do provide for the employer's initial creation of the panel from which the
grievant employee is entitled to select the arbitrator. If a company, especially one creating "just cause" contractual standards for employee
discipline or discharge, prescribed an appointment procedure having
an objectively well-qualified employer-chosen panel but with an employee "veto" for cause, a reasonable argument can be made that a court
should properly take account of all the facts in assessing its validity.72
An arbitral forum was not considered neutral when a for-profit arbitrator-designating agency got forty-two percent of its business from
the employer, thus creating a "symbiotic relationship."73 But courts
have sustained similar mandatory arbitration arrangements when the
employer was the source of less than one percent or an unspecified
amount of the designating agency's business.74
β. Shortening Limitations Periods

Short limitations periods for filing grievances, often thirty days
less, are common and accepted in unionized firms.75 It is important in
ongoing operation to put disputes to rest and to get on with business.
the same time, the existence of a union and a well-publicized grievance
system makes it unlikely that many employees will be unaware of tim

limits. That is not necessarily true in nonunion establishments. Ev
though employer-promulgated plans usually provide fairly genero

180-day or one-year time limits on filing claims, employees may not be
miliar with them. Statutes often provide even longer limitations period

71. McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2004). Although the cou

struck down the offending portion of the arbitration provision, it upheld the trial cour
severance of the clause and its order to arbitrate, with the substitution of the America

Arbitration Association's arbitrator selection procedures. McMullen v. Meijer, Inc.,
F. App'x 164 (6th Cir. 2006). This approach, severing the invalid provision but enforc
arbitration, might appear a reasonable compromise. But it leaves the old problem t
employers will have less incentive to clean up their contracts. Most employees will si

ply go along with the arbitration arrangement as written.

72. Cf. Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 498 S.E.2d 898, 904 (S.C. Ct. App. 199
(holding agreement not unconscionable where employee had power to "veto" employ
selection, which would result in court appointment of arbitrator under FAA), affd afte
remand on other grounds sub nom. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349 (S
2002), vacated and remanded, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).

2005).

73. Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 385-86 (6th Ci

74. Gilbert v. Big Sandy Furniture, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-0087, 2007 WL 2668137, at
*4-5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 6, 2007); Thomas & King, Inc. v. Jaramillo, Civ. No. 08-191-JBC,
2009 WL 649073, at *10-ll (E.D. Ky. Mar. 10, 2009).
75. Elkouri & Elkouri: How Arbitration Works 217-27 (Alan Miles Ruben ed., 6th
ed. 2003). Some collective bargaining agreements have no specified time limit, or only a

"reasonable" one, on the filing of grievances. Id. at 218.
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The Due Process Protocol does not cover this subject and the courts have
dealt differently with variances between statutes and employer plans.
The Ninth Circuit may have taken the stiffest position. It held sub-

stantively unconscionable an employer-imposed one-year limitations
period in a sexual harassment case because it could conflict with the
continuing violation doctrine under California's Fair Employment and
Housing Act.76 On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit held that such a
one-year time limit would not "unduly burden" an employee's vindication of rights under federal civil rights legislation.77 A court might well
feel differently about a thirty-day or sixty-day limitations period in the

contract of an individual employee, even though even shorter periods
are standard in collective agreements of unionized employees. Wholly
apart from arbitration clauses, however, there is a considerable body of
federal decisions upholding agreements for a "reasonable" shortening
of the limitations periods in federal statutes or under state law.78
Other courts have held that the validity of arbitration agreements
shortening time limits for filing claims is a question for the arbitrator.
A federal district court in Tennessee said that timeliness was a "gateway" procedural issue and not a defense against arbitration on which
the court should rule.79 The court added: "Although the court cannot
conclude, as a matter of federal arbitration law, that the ninety (90) day
time limit is per se unenforceable, there are a number of legal and equitable reasons why an arbitrator might decide not to enforce the limit
on the facts of this case."80 The Third Circuit has similarly declared that

the validity of an arbitration agreement's limitations period shorter
than that of the relevant statute is a question for the arbitrator.81 That

76. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003).
77. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 673 n.16 (6th Cir. 2003).
A one-year limitations period would not affect the 180-day and 300-day initial filing
periods of such major federal antidiscrimination legislation as Title VTI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (2006), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,

29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d) (West Supp. 2010), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42

U.S.C. § 12117(a)(2006).
78. See, e.g., Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 397 F.3d 352, 357-59 (6th Cir. 2004)
(state law and § 1981); Northlake Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Waffle House Sys. Emp. Benefit Plan,

160 F.3d 1301, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 1998) (ERISA); Taylor v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 966
F.2d 1188, 1203-06 (7th Cir. 1992) (§ 1981). But cf. Conway v. Stryker Med. Div., No.
4:05-CV-40, 2006 WL 1008670, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2006) (holding unconscionable
and unenforceable an arbitration agreement with a six-month time limit as applied to a
claim under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act, while the FMLA's limitations are

three years for willful violations and two years for others).

79. Hardin v. Morningside of Jackson, L.L.C., 425 F. Supp. 2d 898, 911-12 (W.D.
Tenn. 2006). See generally Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-86

(2002).

80. Hardin, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
81. See Great W Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 231-32 (3d Cir. 1997)
(one-year limitations period in agreement).
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court also held that an arbitrator should handle the application of the
American Arbitration Association's rule, which was incorporated in
the arbitration agreement, that in disputes involving statutory rights,
the relevant statute's limitations period should govern the time for arbitration filing.82
c. Waivers of Class Actions

In recent years, a burning issue has become the validity of agr
ments requiring the waiver of class actions, which have been imp
by business firms on employees and especially on consumers. The
mary purpose is to discourage the pursuit of relatively small clai
These would not be worth the costs even of arbitration on an individual

basis but might well justify a collective action. Since thousands of dollars are frequently at stake if there is a lost job, that makes individual

discharge claims worthwhile and thus most of the court cases have
involved consumers.83 Still, employees may have wage claims that are
too small for pursuing individually.
Probably the most significant recent decision on the validity of
class action waivers in an employee's arbitration agreement is Gentry v. Superior Court.84 Gentry sued Circuit City on behalf of himself
and other salaried customer service managers, alleging they had been
misclassified as exempt employees not entitled to overtime pay under
California's wage and hour laws. Circuit City moved to compel arbitration. Gentry's agreement contained a class action waiver as well
as a provision allowing the employee thirty days to opt out of the arbitration arrangement. The California Supreme Court made several
important rulings. First, the statutory wage and hour provisions were

82. Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 611 (3d Cir. 2002) (arbitration
agreement contained a shorter one-year limitations period; the court also cited approvingly a prior decision in which the court itself addressed the merits of a public policy
claim against an arbitral provision).
83. For the varying judicial reactions, compare In re American Express Merchants'
Litigation, 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding class action waiver in arbitration clause
in credit-card acceptance agreement not enforceable in plaintiff merchants' federal antitrust action), Feeney v. Dell Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753, 761-66 (Mass. 2009) (holding waiver
invalid and arbitration unenforceable in action to prevent manufacturer's collection of
sales tax), Kinkel ν. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (111. 2006) (finding class action waiver in arbitration agreement of cellular phone provider was unconscionable), and
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (invalidating waiver in arbitration
agreement of cable TV customers alleging antitrust violation), with McGinnis v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., No. C08-106Z, 2009 WL 4824002, at *7-8 (W.D.Wash. Dec. 9, 2009) (upholding
phone customer's waiver under Ohio law and enforcing arbitration), Livingston v. Associates Finance, Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2003) (enforcing class action waiver in arbitration by borrowers against lenders), and Snowden υ. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d
631 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding class action waiver not preclusive of effective vindication of
statutory rights and not unconscionable).
84. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007), cert, denied, 128 S. Ct. 1743

(2008).
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not waivable. Next, the court declared that if the trial court found "a
class arbitration is likely to be a significantly more effective practical
means of vindicating the rights of the affected employees than individ-

ual litigation or arbitration,... it must invalidate the class arbitration
waiver."85 Factors to consider in making that determination included
"the modest size of the potential individual recovery, the potential for
retaliation against members of the class, [and] the fact that absent
members of the class may be ill informed about their rights."86 But the
court specifically held that not all class action waivers were invalid,
thus refusing to apply a per se or bright-line rule.87 Finally, the court
rejected Circuit City's argument on the controlling importance of the
thirty-day opt-out provision in negating any notion that the arbitration

agreement was procedurally unconscionable. Regardless of that, the
nonwaivability of the statutory wage and hour rights was held the key
to resolving the validity of the class action waiver.88

Like Gentiy, the First Circuit held a class action waiver unconscionable under Massachusetts law as applied to an employee alleging a violation of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.89 Also like Gentry, the court emphasized that it was not declaring

all such waiver clauses invalid but was only making a decision on the
basis of the particular facts before it. So viewed, the clause subjected
employees to "oppression and unfair surprise" because "[t]he timing,
the language, and the format of the presentation of the [Dispute Resolution] Program obscured, whether intentionally or not, the waiver of
class rights."90 Citing the Supreme Court's Bazzle decision,91 the court
further stated that the waiver question would ordinarily be for the ar-

bitrator to decide, but here the parties had agreed the court should
resolve it.92

The Fifth Circuit and a few other courts still seem to believe that

Supreme Court language in Gilmer calls for the routine enforcement of

85. Id. at 568.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 567-68.
88. Id. at 570-73.

89. Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007).

90. Id. at 60.

91. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 US. 444, 452 (2003). In Stoít-Nielsen S.A. v.

AnimalFeeds International Corp., No. 08-1198 (U.S. April 27, 2010), an action against
shipping companies by commercial customers, a 5-3 Supreme Court majority held that
an arbitration panel had exceeded its powers under the FAA by imposing its own view

of sound public policy in allowing a class action when the parties' arbitration agreement
was silent on the subject. Justice Ginsburg, writing for three dissenters, emphasized

that the Court had noted the parties were "sophisticated business entities" and thus "the
Court apparently spares from its affirmative-authorization requirement contracts of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." Id., slip op. at 13 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The availability of class actions as a due-process element in employee and consumer
cases therefore seems to remain up in the air.
92. Skirchak, 508 F.3d at 56-57.
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class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements.93 It is true

that parties seeking the invalidation of these and other arbitration
clauses generally bear the burden of proving that the provisions are
unconscionable or impede the effective vindication of statutory rights.94
But the trend appears to be that, given appropriate circumstances, this
burden can be borne without excessive difficulty.
d. Limitations on Remedies

Nothing would seem more fundamental to Garner's thesis that

mandatory arbitration merely constitutes a change of forums and not a
loss of substantive statutory rights than the principle that the arbitrator must be able to provide the same remedies as a court.95 Most courts
agree, but they have handled the problem in different ways. The Third

and Ninth Circuits have held that limitations on remedy, at least in
conjunction with other unconscionable provisions, render the arbitr
tion agreement unenforceable, and thus the claim must be litigated.96
Perhaps the most common approach, taken by the District of Columbia,
Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, is to invalidate the limiting clause
sever it, and enforce arbitration, presumably with the arbitrator empowered to award the relief authorized by statute.97 The Eighth an
Eleventh Circuits have left the validity of the limitations on remedy to

the arbitrator in the first instance.98

The Seventh Circuit apparently takes another view. In a consumer
case, Judge Frank Easterbrook spoke for the court in suggesting that a
party could agree to waive even a right as significant as the full statutory
remedy so long as there was no anti-waiver provision in the statute.99

93. Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004)
("[W]e reject... Appellants' claim that their inability to proceed collectively deprives
them of substantive rights available under the FLSA. The Supreme Court rejected simi-

lar arguments concerning the ADEA in Gilmer, despite the fact that the ADEA, like the
FLSA, explicitly provides for class action suits.") (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) ("[T]he fact that the [ADEA] provides for the possibility of bringing a collective action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation

were intended to be barred." (citation omitted))).

94. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) (arbitration

costs).

95. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
96. Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003). California regards limitations on remedies as

"invalid on their face." Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 570 (Cal. 2007) (citing
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., 6 P.3d 669, 683 (Cal. 2000)).
97. Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Spinetti v. Serv.
Corp. Int'l, 324 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003); Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2003);
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003). See also In re PolyAmerica, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 360 (Tex. 2008).
98. Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 681 n.6 (8th Cir. 2001); Summers v. Dillards, Inc., 351 F.3d 1100 (11th Cir. 2003).
99. Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, 294 F.3d 924,

928-29 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Dictum in an earlier employment case in the Seventh Circuit would seem
to support that position.100 Judge Easterbrook's reasoning makes sense
where one party in an equal bargaining relationship decides to forgo certain statutory entitlements to obtain a more preferred substitute. But

when a compelled arbitration clause is coupled with a compelled surrender of substantive statutory rights and remedies, the rationale for
upholding mandatory arbitration clauses dissolves. This is the quintessential situation for imposing a bright-line rule.
ε. Arbitrators' Fees and Costs

A plaintiff in a civil court action has to pay only a nominal filing

fee. Parties in commercial and union-management arbitrations customarily share the costs of the arbitrator. That could be prohibitively

expensive for individual grievants in employment arbitrations. Fo
that reason, the D.C. Circuit ruled in a leading case that the validit

of a mandatory arbitration agreement is conditioned on the employer's
paying all arbitral fees and expenses.101 In fact, many if not most em-

ployment arbitration plans follow that practice. But numerous arb
tration agreements require the employee to pay at least part of th

arbitrator's costs, and courts have had to pass on the enforceability of
those provisions, or even, if severance is not allowed, on the enforc
ability of the arbitration agreement as a whole.
In a nonemployment case decided under the FAA, the Supreme
Court held that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that arbitration
fees and costs are so high as to jeopardize their capacity to enforc
statutory rights.102 In following that approach, lower courts have paid
heed to such specific facts as the dollar costs of a particular arbitration
and the financial condition of the employee involved. For example, the
Sixth103 and Ninth104 Circuits have been rather generous to employees

100. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994

("[P]arties are as free to specify idiosyncratic terms of arbitration as they are to specify
any other terms in their contract.").
101. Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
102. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). The FAA applies to
employment arbitration agreements except those in the transportation industry. Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
103. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding cost-

splitting provision unenforceable since it would deter substantial number of potent
claimants under federal statute but clause severable and arbitration enforceable); Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating same principle on cost-splitting
but clause not severable and case remanded to determine validity of cost-splitting o
facts and enforceability of arbitration).
104. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
filing fee of $75 and cost-splitting were unconscionable and numerous unconscionab
clauses made arbitration unenforceable). But cf. Jackson v. Rent-A-Center W., Inc., 58
F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2009) (fee-sharing agreement not substantively unconscionable in it
self, despite significant unknown arbitration costs) (applying Nevada law), cert, granted,
130 S. Ct. 1133 (2010).
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while the Fourth105 and Fifth106 Circuits have been less so. Other issues

considered in these cases included whether employees' capacity to pay
should be determined on an individual basis or on the basis of similarly

situated persons, and whether an invalid arbitration clause is severable, leaving the remainder of the arbitration agreement enforceable,
or whether an invalid clause renders the whole arbitration agreement
unenforceable. In contrast to the judicial treatment of other common
provisions in arbitration agreements which were discussed earlier,
courts seem more willing to assess the legitimacy of cost-allocation
clauses themselves, rather than refer the question to the arbitrator.
Since a party starting a court suit would ordinarily have to pay some
filing fee, imposing an arbitration fee in no greater amount appears a
justified cost-sharing arrangement. It might also help to deter frivolous
grievances.
In a 2002 study by Professors Michael LeRoy and Peter Feuille of
the University of Illinois, employment arbitrators' average daily fees
of $2,000 were reported to be almost three times as high as labor arbitrators' average of $700. 107 One of the authors' key findings was that
fifty percent of the federal appellate court decisions they examined declined to order arbitration when employees objected that cost allocations made arbitration too inaccessible.108 LeRoy and Feuille concluded
that courts were especially sensitive to cost barriers to arbitration for
lower-paid employees and speculated: "[W]ill expensive arbitration
service providers price themselves out of a large segment of the ADR
market?"109

f. Expanded Judicial Review; "Manifest Disregard
of the Law"

In Hall Street Associates, L.L. C. υ. Mattel, Inc.,110 the Supreme Court
purported to resolve a split among the circuits and held that, in an ex-

105. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding 50-50 arbitrator fee splitting enforceable when plaintiff did not show it impaired his individual capacity to arbitrate, and arbitration was thus enforceable).
106. Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that

plaintiff failed to show arbitral award was contrary to public policy in requiring plaintiff
to pay $3,150 as his one-half share of "forum fee"). See also Acosta v. Fair Isaac Corp., 669

F. Supp. 2d 716 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
107. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitration,
50 UCLA L. Rev. 143, 160 (2002). By 2008 the median daily rates for labor arbitrators
on the rosters of two major designating agencies had risen to $913 and $1,000. Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service, 2008 Annual Report 8 (2009); American Arbitration Association, 2008 AAA Labor Statistics 5 (presented at Annual Meeting of the Nat'l

Acad. of Arb., May 21-23, 2009, Chicago, 111., on file with author).

108. LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 107, at 177.

109. Id. at 194-95.

110. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
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pedited review of an arbitral award under the FAA, the grounds for vacatur or modification set out in the statute are "exclusive" and may not
be expanded by an agreement of the parties. Thus, such extreme misconduct as "fraud," "corruption," "evident partiality," "exceeded... powers," or denial of due process would be the only basis under the FAA for
denying enforcement of an award. But the Court went on to say that it
was only deciding the limits of judicial review under the FAA and was

not addressing the arguable scope of review under state statutory or
common law.111 Specifically, the status of an arbitrator's "manifest disregard of the law" as grounds for vacatur was left up in the air.112

Hall Street involved a landlord-tenant dispute but its holding is
applicable to employment arbitration under the FAA and could, at
least by analogy, be applicable to labor arbitration as well.113 Justice
Souter's cautious if not ambiguous language in the majority opinion
left the courts of appeals uncertain about the sweep of the decision;

meanwhile, in the recent Stolt-Nielsen SA ν. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,114
the Supreme Court stated: "We do not decide whether 'manifest disregard' survives our decision in Hall Street ... as an independent ground
for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur
set forth [in the FAA]."115 The uncertainty is apparent in the circuits.

The Fifth Circuit seems to conclude that "manifest disregard" is no
longer an independent, nonstatutory ground for vacating awards.116
The Ninth Circuit apparently reaches the same result, but by treating "manifest disregard" as simply shorthand for the FAAs statutory
grounds.117 The Second Circuit may be divided. One panel appears to
embrace the Ninth Circuit's portmanteau approach to "manifest disregard," but a later panel would retain it as the one nonstatutory or

common law ground for vacatur.118

One scholar argues strongly that Hall Street should be read as

invalidating only private efforts to expand judicial review but not ap-

111. Id. at 590.

112. See generally James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial
Review Under the Federal Arbitration Act , 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 745 (2009); Robert Ellis,
Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel,
Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008), 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1187 (2009).
113. For a comprehensive discussion of the growing interaction between the FAA
and union-management arbitration, see William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act and Modern Labor Arbitration, 55 Emory L.J. 609 (2006).
114. No. 08-1198 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2010).
115. Id., slip op. at 7 n.3.
116. Citigroup Global Mkt. Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 356-58 (5th Cir. MM).
117. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assoes., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).

118. Compare Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94-95

(2d Cir. 2008) ("manifest disregard" refers to FAA grounds collectively), rev'd on other
grounds, No. 08-1198 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2010), with Vaughn v. Leeds, Morelli & Brown, P.C.,
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propriate expansion by the courts to ensure the "integrity" of their
enforcement of arbitral awards.119 1 join those who are wary about enfeebling arbitration's many advantages by enlarging judicial review.120

Nonetheless, I am satisfied that the courts will find a way, using one
theory or another, to prevent certain extreme results, such as an arbi-

trator's mangling an individual employee's claims under civil rights
legislation.121
G. Arbitration Fairness Act

As mentioned earlier, the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA)
now before Congress would take an axe to the problem of mandatory a
bitration by prohibiting all pre-dispute employment arbitration agree-

ments.122 Post-dispute arbitration agreements are inherently faire
to workers than pre-dispute agreements, especially if the latter ar
a condition for a job. Pre-dispute agreements are usually executed b

employees at the time of hiring, when they are prone to sign any docu

ment placed before them. The post-dispute agreement is more likel
to be truly voluntary, since it is entered into after a particular issu

has arisen, the relevant facts are mostly known, and the employee can
make an informed decision about whether to arbitrate or go to cour
A discharged employee has little or nothing to lose by rejecting an employer's offer of arbitration.

Yet the AFA's solution to the problem seems short-sighted and
too heavy-handed. Management representatives reported to the
Dunlop Commission that employers would generally not be willing to
enter into post-dispute arbitration agreements.123 A spokesperson for

the American Arbitration Association testified before Congress that
"based on many years of experience . . .very few parties will agree to

315 F. App'x 327, 330 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing "manifest disregard" as sole nonstatu-

tory grounds for vacatur).

119. Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 Yale L.J. Online 1, 5-6

(2009), http://yalelawiournal.org/2009/09/29/aragaki.html.
120. For diverse views, see Russ Bleemer, The Calm and the Storm: Arbitration

Experts Speak Out on Hall Street Associates, 26 Alternatives to High Cost Litig. 104
(2008).

121. Courts have been less deferential in dealing with arbitral awards applying
civil rights statutes, like Title VII and § 1981. See, e.g., Hance v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 571
F.3d 511, 519 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[A] federal court should not consider an arbitrator's decision binding in a discrimination suit, because to do so would 'unnecessarily limit[] the
plaintiff's opportunity to vindicate his statutory and constitutional rights.'") (quoting
Becton v. Detroit Terminal of Consol. Freightways, 687 F.2d 140, 142 (6th Cir. 1982)).
122. See supra notes 3 and 4 and accompanying text. The AFA would also apply to
disputes involving civil rights, consumers, and franchisees. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2
(2009); S. 931, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
123. See Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, U.S. Dep'ts
of Labor & Commerce, Fact Finding Report 118 (1994).
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arbitration post-dispute."124 Employers will wait out most smaller
claims, assuming employees will not be able to pursue them in court.
Conversely, employees and their lawyers are unlikely to agree to arbitrate the big case rather than get it before a judge and jury. Viewed

realistically, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, when neither

party knows what the future holds, may be the most viable option
for both sides.125 The empirical studies discussed earlier support that
conclusion.

The National Academy of Arbitrators is composed of about 630
of the leading labor arbitrators in the United States and Canada. To
preserve neutrality, the Academy's long-standing policy is not to take
"any official position on the question of whether there should or should

not be statutory regulation of voluntary labor dispute arbitration,"
but still "indicate its judgment of the desirable content of regulatory
statutes."126 Thus, at its most recent national meeting in October 2009,
the Academy's Board of Governors declined to express any opinion on
whether the AFA should or should not prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements or other mandatory arbitration arrangements. Nonetheless, the Board recommended that at least any legally permissible
form of mandatory arbitration should include a comprehensive set of
due process protections for covered employees. The Academy would expressly exclude from these statutory mandates arbitration provisions
contained in collective bargaining agreements and arbitration agreements that are individually and freely negotiated, such as those with a
top business executive or network TV anchor.127

III. ADR in Union-Management Labor Relations
Over the last quarter century, developments in ADR in traditional

union-management relations have been less dramatic than in individual employment relations. Still, refinements in ADR in labor law have
been significant.

124. Fairness and Voluntary Arbitration Act: Hearing on H.R. 534 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th

Cong. 115 (2000) (prepared statement of Florence Peterson, General Counsel, American
Arbitration Association). But see Coleman, supra note 50.
125. For an elaboration of this position, see Estreicher, supra note 33, at 563-64
(2001).

126. Harry Abrahams, Report of Committee on Law and Legislation, 10 Nat l Acad.
Arb. app. C at 201 (Jean T. McKelvey ed., 1957).
127. The author chaired the committee reporting on tnis subject to me Acaaemy s

Board of Governors. For a range of other views, see Arbitration-Congress Considers Bill
to Invalidate Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses for Consumers, Employees, and Franchisees

Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 111th Cong. (2007), 121 Harv. L. Rev. 2262
(2008).
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A. Reaffirmation of the Steelworkers Trilogy
In the hotly contested field of labor law, with clashes often reflected

in closely divided Supreme Court decisions, arbitration was the sector in which the Court achieved the greatest unanimity. Arbitration
also was the area in which unions and employees fared the best. Yet
employers could find this a blessing in disguise, saving them the time
and expense of extended court litigation. In AT&T Technologies, Inc. υ.
Communications Workers,128 the Court reaffirmed and refined four
principles set forth in the famed 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy129 concerning the judicial enforcement of an executory agreement to arbitrate:

• Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party need not arbitrate unless it has so agreed.
• The court, not the arbitrator, is to decide whether a party has
agreed to arbitrate, unless the parties clearly provide otherwise.

• The arbitrator, not the court, is to decide the claim under the
collective bargaining agreement, even if the claim appears frivolous to the court.

• If the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability. Arbitration should not be denied un-

less the clause cannot be interpreted as covering the dispute.
Doubts are resolved in favor of coverage.

Some parties, most often employers, resist these standards in
seemingly extreme situations. That is understandable, especially from
a partisan perspective, but both logic and policy are on the side of the
Court. A typical arbitration clause covers "all disputes arising under
the contract," with rare exclusions, and is not limited to "meritorious"
or "nonfrivolous" claims. And, as a practical matter, even the arbitration of frivolous claims may serve a therapeutic function, clearing the
air and letting the parties get on with their business.
B. "Public Policy" Challenges
One of the most controversial issues of recent years has been the
authority of a court to set aside an arbitration award on the grounds it
violates "public policy." In United Paperworkers International Union v.

128. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).

129. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enter.
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The first two cases dealt with the enforcement
of an agreement to arbitrate; Enterprise dealt with the enforcement of an arbitral award
once issued. Generally, Enterprise held that a court should not review the merits of an
award and should confine itself to such questions as whether there was any fraud or corruption, denial of due process, or exceeding of the arbitrator's commission.
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Misco, Inc.,130 the Fifth Circuit had refused to enforce an arbitrator's

reinstatement of an employee whose job was operating a dangerous
paper-cutting machine and whose car had been found to contain marijuana while in the company parking lot. The Supreme Court reversed,

declaring that "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing

or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority,

that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to

overturn his decision."131 The Court naturally recognized the general

common-law doctrine that a contract will not be enforced if it violates

the law or public policy. But it cautioned that there must be "'some
explicit public policy' that is 'well defined and dominant, and is to be
ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests.'"132
Some lower courts still didn't seem to "get it." The Supreme Court
had to reinforce the lesson in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United
Mine Workers District 17.133 This time an arbitrator had ordered the
reinstatement of a truck driver who had twice tested positive for mar-

ijuana. The arbitrator substituted a three-month suspension for the
discharge, however, and the employee had to undergo drug treatment
and testing and accept "last chance" terms with the reinstatement. The
employer argued that the award was contrary to public policy, but the
Court disagreed. It first emphasized that the award should be treated

as the equivalent of an agreement by the parties on the meaning of
"just cause." It then applied Misco, pointing out that the relevant fed-

eral statute and Department of Transportation regulations contained
both antidrug and rehabilitation provisions for safety-sensitive posi-

tions but nothing that would specifically prohibit the grievant's reem-

ployment. Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurring, would have been

even more deferential. They would enforce an agreement or award unless it violated some positive law, not just a "public policy."134

With a unanimous Supreme Court sustaining the award in Eastern Associated Coal, and with two of the most conservative Justices
its most ardent champions, the final stake ought to have been driven
through the heart of nebulous public policy challenges to arbitration.
But the objectors have shown remarkable resilience over the years,
and there is still available the claim that an award violates enacted

law or clear public policy, or does not "draw its essence" from the col-

130. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
131. Id. at 38.

132. Id. at 43 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, lnt'1 Union ot the Kubber,
Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
133. 531 U.S. 57 (2000).

134. Id. at 68.
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lective bargaining agreement, or that the arbitrator has attempted to
"dispense his own brand of industrial justice."135

C. Legal Grounds for Vacatur; "Manifest Disregard of the Law"
In addition to efforts to overturn arbitral awards on broad public
policy grounds, challenges are frequently mounted on the theory that
enforcing the award would violate the law or that the arbitrator acted
in "manifest disregard of the law." The latest developments concerning

the general principles in the latter area have been treated in Part IIF-2-f, supra. "Manifest disregard" does not refer to an arbitrator's simple mistake of law; it is akin to an outrageous or defiant refusal to accept a known legal dictate.136
The Ninth Circuit vacated an arbitral award that conflicted with

an applicable National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision.137 The
Sixth Circuit, however, upheld an award interpreting a union-company
neutrality agreement to restrict the employer's antiunion speech dur-

ing an organizing campaign, despite the company's reliance on the
guarantee of free speech in section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations

Act.138 A number of courts have sustained awards against claims the
arbitrator had violated public policy on safety or ruled in manifest disregard of public safety.139

135. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960).
For a pessimistic view of the likelihood of keeping the courts' hands off labor arbitration
awards, see David E. Feller, Presidential Address: Bye-Bye Trilogy, Hello Arbitration! ', 46
Nat'l Acad. Arb. 1, 9-13 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1994). See generally Charles B. Craver,
Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective Bargaining Process, 66 Chi.-Kent L.

Rev. 571, 599-605 (1990); William B. Gould IV, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration

Awards- Thirty Years of the Steelworkers Trilogy: The Aftermath of ΑΎ&Ύ and Misco,

64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 464 (1989). An extreme example of judicial reluctance to heed
Supreme Court doctrine is seen in Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532
U.S. 504 (2001), where the Court summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit's substitution of

its own judgment for that of the arbitrator concerning witness credibilitv Questions.

136. See generally Kevin Patrick Murphy, Alive but Not Well: Manifest Disregard
after Hall Street, 44 Ga. L. Rev. 285, 305 (2009).
137. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr. v. SEIU, 300 F. App'x 471 (9th Cir. 2008) (arbitrator's decision based in part on finding that the parties had stipulated to a bargaining unit, even
though the NLRB previously found that the parties had not stipulated to a bargaining

unit).

138. Int'l Union, UAW v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2002) (construing

NLRA § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2006)).

139. See, e.g., Columbia Gas of Ohio v. Util. Workers Union, 329 F. App'x. 1

(6th Cir. 2009) (award reinstated service technician in a pipeline project who circumvented
inspection of his repair work); Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Int'l Unions of Painters &
Allied Trades, Local 770, 558 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 2009) (award reduced discharge to suspen-

sion for worker who violated an Occupational Safety & Health Administration regula-

tion by failing to wear body harness while working on billboard); Virginia Mason Hosp. v.

Wash. State Nurses Ass'n, 511 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2007) (award prohibited hospital from
unilaterally implementing mandatory flu immunization for nurses); Local 97, IBEW v.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 196 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999) (award reinstated nuclear
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Several decisions have dealt with arbitration awards that potentially conflict with the public policy against racial or sexual harassment
in the workplace. At least prior to Eastern Associated Coal, the courts
of appeals were divided on enforcing the reinstatement of employees

guilty of harassment of co-workers, even if the award substituted a
substantial suspension or loss of back pay for the discharge.140 More
recently, courts have emphasized that a reinstatement award for harassers does not necessarily offend public policy, since the policy does
not require every harasser to be fired. Reinstatements with lesser penalties than discharge were thus upheld.141

D. Contractual Grounds for Vacatur
The Sixth Circuit has conveniently set forth a summary of the circumstances in which it will vacate an arbitral award for a conflict with
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement:
(1) an award conflicts with express terms of the collective bargaining agreement;

(2) an award imposes additional requirements that are not expressly provided in the agreement;

(3) an award is without rational support or cannot be rationally
derived from the terms of the agreement; and

(4) an award is based on general considerations of fairness and
equity instead of the precise terms of the agreement.142

The D.C. Circuit appears to look at the matter in quite a different
way, however, stating: "An arbitration award, as a conceptual matter,
is to be 'treated as though it were a written stipulation by the parties
setting forth their own definitive construction of the contract.'"143 This

power plant employee who responded late to fire alarm and later lied about it), bee also
Extendicare Health Serv. v. Dist. 1199P, SEIU, No. 06-4768, 2007 WL 3121341 (3d Cir.
Oct. 26, 2007) (award reinstated employee at personal care home despite state statute
prohibiting the hiring or retaining of a person with theft-related offenses).
140. Compare Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969
F.2d 1436 (3d Cir. 1992) (vacating award), and Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990) (same), with Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Int'l
Union, Allied Indus. Workers, 959 R2d 685 (7th Cir. 1992) (enforcing award).
141. See, e.g., Way Bakery v. Truck Drivers Local 164, 363 F.3d 590 (6th Uir. 2004);

Weber Aircraft Inc. v. Gen. Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 767, 253 F.3d 821
(5th Cir. 2001); Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 767, 171 F.3d

971 (4th Cir. 1999).

142. Appalachian Reg'l Healthcare, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, Local 14398, 245
F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
143. Am. Postal Workers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 550 F.3d 27, 30 (U.C. Cir. 200b) (quot-

ing Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Theodore
J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise
Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1137, 1140 (1977))). See also Hawaii Teamsters &
Allied Workers, Local 996 v. United Parcel Serv., 241 F.3d 1177, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2001).
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approach takes the parties at their word. Nearly all labor contracts
provide that the arbitrator's award shall be "final and binding." Absent

fraud or other misconduct (or maybe temporary insanity) on the arbitrator's part, that should be the end of the inquiry. Under this view,
an arbitrator's "erroneous" interpretation of a collective agreement is
a contradiction in terms. For enforcement purposes, the award is the
contract.

Since Misco and Eastern Associated Coal, courts have generally
gone a long way in deferring to arbitrators' reading of a labor agreement. Thus, courts have held arbitrators could infer a "just cause" requirement for discipline from a seniority clause and from industrial
"common law"144 and could apply progressive discipline principles under
a provision that simply allowed discharge for "proper cause."145 An arbitrator was entitled to find that strikers were "actively employed" for
bonus purposes.146 But an arbitrator may also properly construe terms
like "work stoppage" against employee interests. A court sustained an
award that a company could discharge a driver who failed to deliver
thirty-seven packages over the span of two days.147 Arbitrators may be
supported when they depart from the literal language of an agreement;
they also can be supported when they stick to it doggedly. One arbitrator was upheld when he read the contract as requiring an employer to
have reasonable cause to believe an employee was under the influence
of drugs at the very moment he was asked to take a test.148
Despite all this, courts are not totally immune from the itch to
do good and to fix the perceived deficiencies of other decision-makers.
One court used a "zipper clause" as a basis for vacating an arbitral
award that relied on past practice in ordering a company to pay driversalespeople at a commission rate higher than that in a newly negotiated
contract.149 Most often courts find support for vacatur in the Supreme
Court's broad language that an award is valid only if it "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement" and that an arbitrator "does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice."150 Yet
sometimes arbitrators and courts have simply emphasized different

144. SFIC Prop., Inc. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Local Lodge 311, 103 F.3d 923

(9th Cir. 1996).

145. United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376

(3d Cir. 1995).

146. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Chem. Workers, 587 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2009).
147. Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120 (1st Cir. 2008).
148. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp. v. United Steelworkers, Local 3740, 294 F.3d 860

(7th Cir. 2002).

149. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Beer Drivers Local 744, 280 F.3d 1133 (7th Cir

2002).

150. United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
See also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987).
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parts of the contract or have looked at the facts differently.151 On the
other hand, an arbitrator who avowedly "interpolates" contract terms
into an agreement containing the usual provision forbidding additions,
subtractions, or other changes in the parties' contract is almost asking
for vacatur and will likely get it.152 Similarly, arbitrators themselves
can open the door to vacatur through indiscreet language that enables
courts to exercise oversight power in the "very limited circumstances"
where arbitrators have "exceeded their authority."153
E. "External Law" in Arbitration

One of the titanic debates among labor arbitrators, which began in
the 1960s and continued well into the 1990s, may have turned out to be
a tempest in a teapot. Major adversaries were Professor Bernard Melt-

zer of the University of Chicago and Robert Howlett, a leading practitioner and public official.154 Meltzer believed that arbitrators faced
with a conflict between the contract they were construing and positive
law should respect the contract and ignore the law. He emphasized
that a collective agreement was the source of the arbitrators' authority
and they had no basis for going beyond it. Howlett believed arbitrators
should give primacy to the law because agreements implicitly incorporate all applicable law and the parties want a "final and binding" resolution of their dispute. The Supreme Court seemed to side with Meltzer.
In the Steelworkers Trilogy it stated that an arbitrator who based his
award on his "view of the requirements of enacted legislation" would
have "exceeded the scope of the submission."155 Moreover, as a practical
matter, it is not always that easy to discern what "the law" is.156

Nevertheless, instances where there is an irreconcilable conflict
between the provisions of a labor contract and the dictates of the law

151. See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 215 F.3d 815
(8th Cir. 2000) (vacating award prohibiting subcontracting, one judge dissenting); U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 204 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2000) (vacating award
regarding separation of probationary employee, one judge dissenting).
152. IBEW, Local 175 v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 182 F.3d 469, 471-72 (6th Uir. lyyy)
(vacating award reinstating employee who failed to notify company within contractually
reauired three davs of medical reason for absence).

153. See, e.g., 187 Concourse Assoc. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524 (2d Cir. 2005) (ar-

bitrator found employer "had no option but to terminate" employee in altercation with
supervisor but still reinstated employee); Salem Hosp. v. Mass. Nurses Ass'n, 449 F.3d
234 (1st Cir. 2006) (arbitrator declared clause on assigning nurses was "not subject to
interpretation" because it had only one possible meaning; court found another meaning

reasonable).
154. Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations about Ideology, Law, ana Labor Ar Duration,

20 Nat'l Acad. Arb. 1 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967); Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the
NLRB, and the Courts, 20 Nat'l Acad. Arb. 67 (Dallas L. Jones ed., 1967).
155. Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.

lob. See, e.g., inti tsna. oi Teamsters v. united ötaies, ^oi u.o. o*<± klvi u, wmui

overturned the holdings of six courts of appeals in over thirty cases and the dicta of
others in significant rulings concerning the legitimacy of seniority systems under Ti
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
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are probably quite rare. Parties can usually be presumed to want the
arbitrator to interpret their contract so as to comply with the law and
keep the award from being vacated. By the end of the twentieth century, arbitrators were in the regular business of interpreting civil rights

statutes. That was often because collective agreements had expressly
incorporated the statutes by reference, or had borrowed statutory language in a way that invited such treatment. In any event, the end re-

sult was that one scholar asked, not unfairly, whether it was time to

declare Howlett the winner of the great debate.157

F. Arbitrators' Rulings on Civil Rights
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court decided in the leading
Gilmer case that an employer and an individual nonunion employee
could agree that all employment disputes, including statutory civil
rights claims, would be resolved through arbitration, not court actions.158 Previously, the Court had seemed to take a different approach

in collective bargaining situations, holding in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co. that an adverse arbitration award did not preclude a black
grievant from bringing a court suit on his racial discrimination claim.159

The Gilmer Court reasoned that there, unlike Gardner-Denver, the
parties' contract authorized the arbitrator to apply the relevant statute. Recently, in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,160 the Court effectively reversed direction from Gardner-Denver and held that a union, by "clear

and unmistakable" language, could waive unionized employees' rights
to bring statutory discrimination claims and require them to arbitrate
instead. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented.
Pyett created a storm of legal controversy, but in practice it may
turn out to be a dud. Language like that in the 14 Penn Plaza contract
is extremely rare. Leading union lawyers insist that few if any other

labor organizations will adopt it. Management's position is uncertain.
On the merits, however, if an isolated and vulnerable individual, like
the employee in Gilmer, can waive statutory procedural rights, it is
hard to see why a union, on a much more equivalent bargaining level
with management, cannot do the same. My one qualification is that

157. Martin H. Malin, Revisiting the Meltzer-Howlett Debate on External Law in
Labor Arbitration: Is It Time for Courts to Declare Howlett the Winner? 24 Lab. Law. 1
(2008). In a 2004 survey of National Academy members, about a 2-1 majority said they

would follow the contract rather than the law in the event of an irreconcilable conflict.

But almost sixty percent also stated they would not order a party to violate external
law. That was the position of a third debater, Richard Mittenthal. See Theodore J. St.
Antoine, External Law in Arbitration: Hard-Boiled, Soft-Boiled, and Sunny-Side Up, 57
Nat'l Acad. Arb. 185, 189-90 (Charles J. Coleman ed., 2005).
158. See supra notes 1 and 20 and accompanying text.

159. 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974).

160. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). See also Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S.
70, 82 (1998). Presumably employees can still file charges with EEOC. See supra note 22.
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the union should only be able to waive the employees' right to sue the
employer - not the union itself. The latter would appear a clear conflict
of interest. In acting on behalf of employees, a union of course is subject
to the duty of fair representation.161 It must treat all the employees it
represents fairly and without discrimination. Anyone with any experience knows that most unions take this duty very seriously, if only for
fear of the consequences of being hauled before unfriendly judges and
juries. Thus, for all the misgivings about Pyett, it may prove in the end
to be of little moment. Even if that is not so, it is unlikely to become the
damaging blow to unionized workers that some have predicted.
G. Extent of Arbitration Practice

Despite the nosedive in union density since the 1950s, from approximately thirty-five percent to twelve percent, or around one-third
of what it had been,162 the decline in the number of annual labor arbitration awards has followed a different pattern. Of course the workforce

has been growing steadily, so that the absolute number of unionized
workers has only fallen from 16.8 million in the mid-1950s to 15.3 million today, and actually peaked at more than 22 million (by one count)
in the late 1970s.163 That historical trend correlates better, though by
no means exactly, with the rise and fall of the arbitration caseload of
the American Arbitration Association and the Federal Mediation and

Conciliation Service (FMCS):164
AAA and FMCS Arbitration Awards in Representative Years, 1971-2008
Year

AAA

1971

FMCS

3,837

1975

3,784

TOTAL

2,840

6,677

4,484

8,268

1980

7,382

7,539

14,921

1985

6,563

4,406

10,969

1994

5,112

4,949

10,061

2003

3,769

2,746

6,515

2008

2,936

2,066

5,002

161. See,
Grossman,

2007).

162.

See

e.g., Vaca ν. Sipes, 3
Employment Discrim

supra

note

31.

163. Id.; Dennis K. JNolan & Koger l. Abrams, irenas m rnvate sector unevance

Arbitration, in Labor Arbitration Under Fire 42, 66-69 (James L. Stern & Joyce M. Najita eds., 1997).
164. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 163, at 68-71; American Arbitration Association,

2003 AAA Labor Statistics 3 (presented at Annual Meeting of the Nat'l Acad. of Arb.,
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Professors Dennis Nolan and Roger Abrams have calculated that
the AAA and FMCS account for a little more than a fifth of the arbitra-

tion total.165 If that is so, there were no more than 25,000 labor arbi-

tration awards in 2008. If it is also true that as many as 4,000-5,000
persons in this country style themselves "arbitrators," the pickings are
slim for the vast majority.166 In a 1987 survey, ten percent of the arbitrators decided almost fifty percent of the cases, while the twenty-five
percent with the fewest appointments decided only two percent.167
H. Interest Arbitration and EFCA

The familiar form of grievance, or "rights," arbitration consists of
third-party neutral interpreting and applying the terms of an existin
contract between the parties. By contrast, in "interest" arbitration, th
neutral (or a neutral chair with co-panelists from each of the parti

sets some or all of the terms of a future contract.

1. Background1™

Once the nearly universal view among union and management
representatives and labor relations experts was that interest arbitration, especially government-imposed compulsory arbitration, was antithetical to free collective bargaining. That view was already eroding
in the public sector more than twenty-five years ago. By 1975, about
twenty states, including Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and

Wisconsin, had adopted mandatory interest arbitration in bargaining
impasses for some groups of public employees. Police and firefighters
are the most common, but school teachers, transit workers, and others

are sometimes covered. The Federal Service Impasse Panel handles interest arbitration for federal employees.169

Initially, interest arbitrators were authorized to prescribe what
provisions they considered appropriate within the ranges of the parties'

May 25-27, 2004, Las Vegas, Nev., on file with author); Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 2003 Annual Report 35-38 (2004); American Arbitration Association, 2008
AAA Labor Statistics 2 (presented at Annual Meeting of the Nat'l Acad. of Arb., May
21-23, 2009, Chicago, 111., on file with author); Federal Mediation and Conciliation Ser-

vice. 2008 Annual Report 9 (2009).

165. Nolan & Abrams, supra note 163, at 68. They rightly indicate that all these

statistics are "notoriously slippery." Id. at 66.
166. See Clifford E. Smith, Introduction to the NAA Survey, in Labor Arbitration in
America 1, 6 (Mario F. Bognanno & Charles J. Coleman eds., 1992).
167. Charles J. Coleman, The Arbitrator's Cases: Number, Sources, Issues, and Implications, in Labor Arbitration in America, supra note 166, at 85, 105.
168. Much of this material is drawn from J. Joseph Loewenberg, Interest Arbitration: Past, Present, and Future, in Labor Arbitration Under Fire, supra note 163, at 11

See also B.V.H. Schneider, Public-Sector Labor Legislation- An Evolutionary Analysi
in Public-Sector Bargaining 191, 196-203 (Benjamin Aaron, Joyce M. Najita & James L

Stern eds., 1st ed. 1979).
169. 5 U.S.C. § 7119 (2006).
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offers and demands. Later, influenced by the success of Major League
Baseball's last-best-offer arbitration in getting players and clubs to settle their disputes, a number of states opted for final-offer arbitration.

Arbitrators had to choose one party's proposal or the other's. There
were several variations. Instead of requiring arbitrators to select one
party's whole package, they might be allowed to pick issue-by-issue.
Or the final-offer approach would be limited to "economic" issues and

arbitrators could tinker with the noneconomic items.

Most statutes establishing interest arbitration provide certain
criteria to govern decision-making. These customarily include the employer's ability to pay, cost-of-living changes, and comparable contracts
in comparable communities or among comparable groups of employees.

In my experience, except in extreme cases, ability to pay and cost of
living tend to cancel each other out, leaving comparability as the pre-

dominant factor.

During the last quarter century, an important development in interest arbitration occurred in the private sector. Major steel companies

and the Steelworkers negotiated agreements in 1993 for interest arbitration if they reached impasses during contract reopeners. Interest

arbitrations took place in 1996 for Bethlehem Steel, Inland Steel, and
National Steel against the background of a considerably depressed industry. The companies substantially won all three cases.
2. EFCA's First-Contract Arbitration

If enacted, the proposed Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) will
have the most significant impact in history on the use of interest ar-

bitration in the private sector. Section 3 would amend the National

Labor Relations Act by adding a new section 8(h), which would provide
for interest arbitration in first-contract negotiations if the parties could

not reach agreement within 120 days, including a thirty-day mediation period.170 The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS)
would be responsible for the implementing regulations. The resulting
contract would be binding for two years unless the parties agreed to
earlier changes. The starting point for proponents is that only about
thirty-nine percent of the unions winning NLRB representation elections are able to get a collective contract within one year.171

170. See supra notes 2-3. A more publicized and even more controversial part of
the bill, which would have enabled unions to obtain certification through card checks
rather than secret-ballot elections, was apparently doomed because of the opposition of
moderate Democrats. See Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to Assist
Unions, N.Y. Times, July 17, 2009, at Al.
171. John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of union

Organizing Drives, 1999-2004, 62 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 3, 6 (2008).
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Ronald Hoh, an arbitrator and mediator with extensive service in
state public employment relations boards, has drawn on Canadian and
American experience in dealing with various objections to EFCA's provisions on interest arbitration.172 Major opposing arguments are (1) interest arbitration is a disincentive to voluntary agreement; (2) it would

result in higher wages and benefits; (3) EFCA establishes no criteria
for interest arbitration awards; (4) EFCA sets no minimum qualifications for interest arbitrators and provides no procedures for their selection; and (5) EFCA does not address strikes and lockouts.
Hoh answers that (1) with sufficient mediation efforts, states currently having interest arbitration find resort to it ranges between only
two percent and ten percent of disputes; (2) interest arbitrators try to
set the contract terms the parties themselves would have reached and
do not break new ground; (3) either Congress or the FMCS could easily
add standards for contract terms; (4) the FMCS should create a more
limited roster of interest arbitrators with specified qualifications; and
(5) the statute or implementing regulations should prohibit strikes and

lockouts from the time of a union's certification until the issuance of
an interest arbitration award.

Nearly all of Hoh's comments and recommendations have merit,
subject to possible qualifications. The total package of EFCA's arbitration provisions, along with Hoh's modifications, may cut too much
against the American grain. Free, voluntary collective bargaining, with

all its accoutrements, is a proven institution. If it turns out that the
wholesale imposition of interest arbitration produces the same sort of
political backlash as was triggered by the card check proposal, I could
imagine some refining of the coverage. The start might be confining
mandatory interest arbitration to those industries where strikes are
unfeasible, either because they are too disruptive of our complex, interrelated economy or because they are too ineffective for employees.
Nationwide transportation and communications generally are prime
examples. Next, Hoh is probably correct that interest arbitration stat-

utes work best when strikes and lockouts are forbidden. But before the

arbitration procedure is actually invoked, I question whether parties in
the private sector should be prevented from using their customary eco-

172. Ronald Hoh, Interest Arbitration Under the Proposed Employee Free Choice
Act: What We Can Learn from the American and Canadian Experiences, Disp. Resol. J.,
Nov. 2009-Jan. 2010, at 50, 50-58. For other views see Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R.
Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free Choice Act, 70 La. L. Rev. 47
(2009); William B. Gould IV, New Labor Law Reform Variations on an Old Theme: Is the
Employee Free Choice Act the Answer?, 70 La. L. Rev. 1, 17-27 (2009); Philip B. Rosen &

Richard I. Greenberg, Constitutional Viability of the Employee Free Choice Act's Interest
Arbitration Provision, 26 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 33 (2008).
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nomic weapons, including strikes and lockouts. Finally, constitutional
questions can be raised about EFCA, but I believe those have been
answered convincingly.173
IV. Mediation

It is almost shameful to treat a subject as large and impo
as labor and employment mediation in hardly more than a f
Indeed, a leading text on ADR devotes close to a third of its

mediation.174 And mediation - the use of a neutral third party
disputants in reaching a voluntary resolution of their differenc

become increasingly of great practical significance in the se

labor and employment disputes.175 Nonetheless, in terms of leg
lation, the action over the past quarter century has been in arbi
not in mediation.

All that could change drastically if either or both the proposed
AFA and EFCA are enacted. The AFAs prohibition of mandatory arbitration would presumably not affect an employer's imposition of
mandatory mediation, at least as a prerequisite to a court suit as distinguished from the filing of charges with an administrative agency
like the EEOC. One highly knowledgeable expert, experienced in labor
relations as practitioner, academic, arbitrator, and federal judge, has
commented that mediation, even mandatory mediation, presents almost none of the problems associated with mandatory arbitration.176
In mediation, of course, the neutral can at most recommend solutions,
not order them. The disputing parties remain in control of the ultimate
disposition.

173. See Fisk, supra note 172, at 82-93. Cf. David Broderdorf, Overcoming the First
Contract Hurdle: Finding a Role for Mandatory Interest Arbitration in the Private Sector,
23 Lab. Law. 323, 335-37 (2008).

174. How ADR Works, supra note 1, at 113-457.
175. Mediation of labor and employment disputes has grown increasingly popular

over the last quarter century, and now constitutes one of the largest growing segments of

mediation practice. Kimberly E. Kovach, Mediation in a Nutshell 279-81 (2003); Vivian
Berger, Employment Mediation in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges in a Changing
Environment, 5 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 487, 507-13 (2003). A short history of mediation
from ancient times through the twentieth century, in labor and other contexts, is found
in Kovach, supra at 16-34. For a discussion of court-ordered mediation and legislatively
mandated mediation, see id. at 96-107. See generally James J. Alfini et al., Mediation

Theory and Practice (2d ed. 2006); Charles B. Craver, Effective Legal Negotiation

and Settlement (5th ed. 2005); Gary Friedman & Jack Himmelstein, Challenging Conflict: Mediation Through Understanding (2008). See also Uniform Law Commissioners,
A Few Facts About the Uniform Mediation Act (2001) (2003), www.nccusl.org/Update/
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uma2001.asp (last visited May 9, 2010) (UMA is
primarily concerned with privilege, confidentiality, and mediators' reports; it has been
enacted in eleven states).

176. Edwards, supra note 29, at 309-10. See also Sherwyn, supra note 26, at

1581-91 (urging further study of the performance of in-house ADR systems as compared

with arbitration or court trial).

ADR in Labor and Employment Law 447
If EFCA's interest arbitration provision is adopted, there will be
another key new function for mediation. Before the compulsory arbitration process commences, there will be at least thirty days of required
mediation under the auspices of the FMCS. At this point, one can only

speculate what this might mean in quantitative terms. Qualitatively,
it would have to mean a significant, systematic, and perhaps unprecedented peacetime role for the federal government in the collective bargaining process in the American private sector.
V. Conclusion

For some of us, the debate over employer-imposed mand
ployment arbitration turns on practical results, not abstrac
In theory, it is wrong to require employees to surrender le

created procedures for enforcing substantive statutory r
price for getting or keeping a job. But in actual operation
arbitration may be the best solution for both employers an
It enables employees, especially the majority who are lowerers, the most realistic access to a forum to pursue their
there is no showing that employees fare less well on th
arbitration than in court. At the same time employers save
gation costs and the risk of the occasional devastating ju
least in actions for vacatur under the FAA, the parties ca
the scope of judicial review beyond the statutory criteria.
In traditional labor arbitration between unions and e
the major development of the last quarter century has been
ing narrowing by the U.S. Supreme Court of the ground
review of arbitral awards. "Public policy" as a basis for
award must be "well defined" and not some judge's sweep
the public good. In non-union employment arbitration, "m
regard of the law" may now be no more than shorthand for
tory grounds in the FAA. The likelihood, however, is tha
not abdicate responsibility for setting aside awards in accor
judicially created standards to avoid a serious miscarriag
such as an arbitrator's erroneous denial of an individua
civil rights claim.
Mediation has not been the subject of extensive legal dev
in the last quarter century. But this more modest, less c
technique for dispute resolution has grown considerably
come much more prominent in the years ahead.

